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MARK McELMAN

During the early morning hours of October 15th, 1982, John Henry
Sansregret broke into the home of his fonner girlfriend. He threatened
her with a butcher's knife and struck her in the face, drawing blood. He
forced her to undress in order to prevent her from leaving the house.
During this ten-i:fying situation his ex-girlfriend, in an attempt to prevent
the hostilities from escalating, pretended she was interested in
reconciling with Sansregret. She told him that they could be lovers again
and initiated sexual intercourse. Later that morning, after Sansregret was
safely out of the house, the girlfriend called the police and filed a
complaint. Soon after, Sansregret was arrested and charged with sexual
assault, among other offences. 1
At trial, the only significant issue with respect to the sexual assault
charge was whether the Crown could prove that Sansregret had known
that the complainant's consent had been ext01ted by threat or fear of
bodily harm. 2 Sansregret asserted the defence of honest mistaken belief
in consent. In a strange twist, this assertion was given credence by the
evidence of the complainant. She testified that she knew the accused
very well and that she was quite certain he had believed, at the time of
the incident, that her consent was been genuine.
The trial judge found that there had been no real consent to the
sexual activity, and that "no one in their right mind" would have
believed consent existed. Despite this, and relying almost exclusively on
the testimony of the complainant, the judge found that Sansregret had
been under an honest mistaken belief in consent. Given this finding of
fact, the judge directed herself to follow the rule set out in R. v.
Pappajohn; 3 that an honest mistaken belief in consent negates proof of
mens rea. She acquitted on the charge of sexual assault.
The facts here are taken from!?. JJ. Sansregre!, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 45 C.R. (3'd) 193
(S.C.c.).
2
(1983) 34 C.R. (3d) 162 (Man. Co. Ct.).
3
[ 1980] 2 S.C.R. 120.
1
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The Crown appealed the decision to the Manitoba Court of Appeal,
where the acquittal was overturned and a conviction entered. 4 This result
produced tension in the Court, with each judge writing a separate
decision. Matas J.A. held that the accused was barred from raising the
defence of mistake by the evidentiary ruling in Pappajohn, which
requires the assertion of mistaken belief in consent to have an "air of
reality". He stated:
.. .it is not open to Mr. Sansregret to terrorize his victim, to follow up
the terror with sexual intercourse, and to end up by innocently
claiming he had an honest belief in his victim's consent. I have
concluded that the defence of mistake of fact does not arise in this
case. 5

This finding may seem strange given that the complainant's testimony
had established the factual finding which led to the success of the
defence at trial. Her credibility in asserting his mistaken belief in
consent can hardly be doubted. This was essentially the position taken
by Philp J.A. in his dissenting opinion. He accepted the findings of fact
at trial and concluded that the defence of mistaken belief in consent had
been successfully established. Like the trial judge, he based his
judgement on the testimony of the complainant and would have upheld
the acquittal and dismissed the Crown's appeal.
Sansregret appealed his conviction, as of right, to the Supreme
Court of Canada. The Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld his
conviction. Writing for the Court, Mcintyre J. chose not to disturb the
finding at trial that Sansregret had acted under an honest mistaken belief
in consent. However, he held that the trial judge had erred in allowing
the defence of mistake of fact given her finding that Sansregret had been
willfully blind to the complainant's lack of consent:
In my view, it was error on the part of the trial judge to give effect to
the "mistake of fact" defence in these circumstances where she had
found that the complainant consented out of fear and the appellant was
willfully blind to the existing circumstances, seeing only what he
wished to see. Where the accused is deliberately ignorant as a result of
blinding himself to reality the law presumes knowledge, in this case
knowledge of the nature of the consent. There was therefore no room
for the operation of this defence.
4

5

(1984) 10 C.C.C (3d) 164, 37 C.R. (3d) 45 (Man. C.A.).
IO C.C.C (3d) 164 at 171-2.
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This is not to be taken as a retreat from the position taken in Pappa.John
that the honest belief in consent need not be reasonable. It is not to be
thought that any time an accused fonns an honest though unreasonable
belief he will be deprived of the defence of mistake of fact. This case
rests on a different proposition. Having willfully blinded himself to the
facts before him, the fact that an accused may be able to preserve what
could be called an honest belief, in the sense that he has no specific
knowledge to the contrary, will not afford a defence because, where
the accused becomes deliberately blind to the existing facts, he is fixed
by law with actual knowledge and his belief in another state of facts is
ine levan t. 6

This decision has stirred much controversy, due in large part to the
intricacy of the conceptual analysis. 7 The concept of "mistake of fact" is
forced into competition with the rival concept of "willful blindness"
such that the Court is forced to define the boundaries between the two.
The Court's final conceptualization is clear: willful blindness negates
mistaken belief as a defence in sexual assault. Less explicit is exactly
how and why this is so.
Much of the confusion and controversy in this area of the law can
be rectified by employing an explicit analysis of the objects of the
debate: the competing mental states of mistaken belief and willful
blindness. The Supreme Court made it clear in Sansregret that any
overlap between the categories will be subsumed into the latter.
However, the fundamental question regarding the conditions under
which mistaken belief amounts to willful blindness remains
unanswered. The analysis which will be applied to this problem is
epistemological. Epistemology (the theory of knowledge) is a central
discipline in philosophy that is concerned with the interaction between
belief, truth, justification, and knowledge. Central questions in this field
concern how individuals respond to their environment though the
formation of belief, and the conditions under which those beliefs can be
said to constitute knowledge. The approach to be applied to the problem
is intuitive, using hypothetical examples to generate basic instincts
about culpability. Intuitions regarding culpability are then subjected to
epistemological analysis in the hope of generating a new doctrinal
model of criminal fault.
6

7

Supra note I at 587-8.
D. Stuart, Canadian Cni11i11al Law: A Treatise, 3'<l ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 212.
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An epistemological ana.lysis is warranted on three grounds. First,
whenever the law sees fit to make "knowledge of a circumstance" an
element of a criminal offense, it has inherently embarked on an
epistemological inquiry. This is similar to the way in which courts are
forced to consider empirical science when causation is incorporated as
an element of an offence. The question "Did the stab wound kill the
victim?" is a matter of medical science. Similarly, the question "Did the
accused hzow that the goods in his possession were stolen?" is a matter
of epistemology. Being explicit about epistemology and its place in the
criminal law may allow for a more productive conceptual analysis.
Second, epistemology concerns itself with questions of objectivity
(trnth) and subjectivity (belief). In this sense, epistemology is a blended
inquiry, partly concerned with beliefs actually held by a subject, and
partly concerned with the objective truth of that which is believed. This
blending of objective and subjective considerations may allow for the
development of a principled compromise between the current
polarization of subjectivist and objectivist orthodoxies. Each orthodoxy
is based on rival intuitions regarding the conditions under which
criminal punishment may be imposed. Given the theoretical standstill
between the positions, perhaps it is time to generate new intuitions.
Lastly, this analysis is justified on the basis that individuals are, by
nature, epistemological agents. They are accustomed to succeeding or
failing on the basis of their ability to form accurate beliefs about their
environments. Holdings of legal accountability on the basis of
epistemological ideals are, therefore, well fitted into a pre-existing
scheme. This has the advantage of not forcing upon people a normative
regime with which they are unfamiliar, as is often the case in the
imposition of the brute force of law. 8
This paper will proceed in four parts. Part I will consist of a brief
summary of current jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine of me11s rea,
focussing on the debate concerning whether the imposition of criminal
liability requires a subjective or objective model of fault. Part II will
present the basic epistemological ideals that will form the basis of
subsequent analysis. Part III will bring into focus the epistemological
8
For instance, the criminal justice system could assume that individuals are informed of the
necessity of careful belief formation and would not have to exercise a Section 19 proJJ1so
deeming them to be so informed.
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elements of the offence of sexual assault. Part IV will demonstrate how
a new doctrine of willful blindness might be employed by the comts, in
cases of sexual assault.

PARTI
The doctrine of mens rea has spawned more jurisprudencial
commentary than any other substantive subject in the criminal law. 9 Its
basic feature is the notion that no act is guilty unless it is accompanied
by a guilty mind. The constitutional dimensions of the doctrine are
developed in R. v. Creighton 10 and R. v. Hzmda/, 11 which serve to
highlight and distinguish subjective and objective models of criminal
fault. In Hzmdal, Cory J. stated:
Depending on the provisions of the pa1ticular section and the context
in which it appears, the constitutional requirement of mens rea may be
satisfied in different ways. The offense can require proof of a positive
state of mind such as intent, recklessness or willful blindness.
Alternatively, the mens rea or element of fault can be satisfied by
proof of negligence whereby the conduct of the accused is measured
on the basis of an objective standard without establishing the
subjective mental state of the particular accused. 12

Justice Cory went on to distinguish the tests proposed by each model:
A truly subjective test seeks to determine what was actually in the
mind of the pmticular accused at the moment the offence is alleged to
have been committed.

In his very useful text, Professor Stuart puts it this way in Canadian
Criminal Law, supra, at pp. 123-124 and 125:
What is vital is that this accused given his personality, situation and
circumstances, actually intended, knew or foresaw the consequence
and/or circumstance as the case may be, whether he "could'', "ought"
or "should" have foreseen or whether a reasonable person would have
foreseen is not the relevant criterion of liability.

9

10
11
12

SlijJranote 7 at 139.

(1993) 23 C.R. (4' 11 ) 189 (S.C.C.).
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 867, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 19 C.R. (4' 11 ) 169.
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 at 882.
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In trying to ascertain what was going on in the accused's mind, as the
subjective approach demands, the trier of fact may draw reasonable
inferences from the accused's actions or words at the time of his act or
in the witness box. The accused may or may not be believed. To
conclude that, considering all the evidence, the Crown has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused "must" have thought in the
penalized way is no depaiiure from the subjective standard. Resort to
an objective would only occur if the reasoning became that the
accused "must have realized it if he had thought about it". [Emphasis
in original.]
On the other hand, the test for negligence is an objective one requiring
a marked depaiiure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.
There is no need to establish the intention of the particular accused.
The question to be answered under the objective test concerns what the
accused "should" have known .... [T]here should be a clear distinction
in the law between one who was aware (pure subjective intent) and one
who should have taken care in-espective of awareness (pure objective
intent). 13

The implications of the subjective model of liability are most
striking when viewed from the perspective afforded by the defence of
mistake of fact. This defence was established in Canada through the
cases of R. v. Rees14 and R. v. Beaver. 15 These cases developed the legal
rule that, where subjective knowledge of a circumstance forms the mens
rea of an offence, an honest mistaken belief regarding the circumstance
negates proof of the required fault element. Thus, in Beaver the accused
was acquitted on a charge of possession of a narcotic because he
honestly believed the white powder found in his possession was sugarof-milk. His honest belief to that effect prevented the Crown from
discharging its burden of proving that he had known that the powder was
a narcotic.
The defence of honest mistake of fact was explicitly held to apply
to the offence of sexual assault in R. v. Pappajohn. 16 This case followed
the reasoning in the controversial British case Director of Public

13
14
15
16

/bid at 882-3.
[1956] S.C.R. 640, 24 C.R. 1, 115 C.C.C. 1, 4 D.L.R. (2d) 406.
[1957] S.C.R. 531, 26 C.R. 193, 118 C.C.C. 129.
Supra note 3.
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Prosecutions v. Morgan. 17 In each case it was held that an honest though
mistaken belief in consent exculpates the accused on a charge of sexual
assault, irrespective of whether the mistake was unreasonable. In
Pappajohn, Dickson J. laid out the defence as it pertains to sexual
assault:
It is not clear how one can properly relate reasonableness (an element

in offences of negligence) to rape (a "true crime" and not an offence of
negligence). To do so, one must, I think take the view that the mens rea
goes only to the physical act of intercourse and not to non-consent, and
acquittal comes only if the mistake is reasonable. This, upon the
authorities, is not a correct view, the intent in rape being not merely to
have intercourse, but to have it with a non-consenting woman. If the
jury finds that mistake, whether reasonable or unreasonable, there
should be no conviction. If, upon the entire record, there is evidence of
mistake to cast a reasonable doubt upon the existence of a criminal
mind, then the prosecution has failed to make its case. 18

The idea that an unreasonable mistake as to consent is exculpatory is
surprising, but the doctrine is simply a logical consequence of the
subjectivist model.
The doctrine of willful blindness fits into the subjectivist scheme in
a rather tenuous way. The uneasy fit is particularly surprising given that
a single theorist, Glanville Williams, has played a significant role in the
entrenchment of both doctrines. Of willful blindness, Williams states:
A court can properly find willful blindness only where it can almost be
said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact; he
realised its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final
confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny
knowledge. This, and this alone, is willful blindness. It requires in
effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the administration
of justice. Any wider definition would make the doctrine of willful
blindness indistinguishable from the civil doctrine of negligence in not
obtaining knowledge. 19

Thus, willful blindness seems to be a type of virtual knowledge the
courts will find when they feel an accused became aware of the need for
further inquiry but declined to make that inquiry because he did not wish
to know the tmth. In a sense, the accused has constmcted a situation in
17
18

19

[1976] A.C.182, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 (H.L.).
Supra note 3 at 152.
G.L. Williams, Cni11i!la! Law; The Ge!leral Fart, 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1961) at 159.
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which knowledge can technically be denied because he chose to remain
ignorant. This doctrine has an uneasy feel: the only motive to engage in
this type of cognitive risk management resides in an implicit
acknowledgement that a risk is present. An acknowledgement to this
effect already satisfies the requirements for a finding of recklessness,
which is also a guilty mental state under the subjectivist model of
culpability. On this account, it seems that wilful blindness may simply
be a convoluted form of recklessness. If wilful blindness is to stand
alone as a distinct form of mens rea, then it should be differentiated,
conceptually, from recklessness. A more productive conception of
wilful blindness is one that focuses, not on a deliberate suppression of
risk awareness, but rather on an active suppression.
The subjectivist/objectivist doctrinal debate has taken on political
dimensions in recent years. The political debate over the doctrines is
especially acute in respect of their application to the offence of sexual
assault. As evidenced by Pappajohn, the courts have elected to employ
the subjective model to this offence. Liberals defend this on the grounds
that the imposition of criminal punishment requires justification. Liberal
theorists maintain that punishment for sexual assault can only be
justified when there exists an element of subjective fault on the part of
the accused. It is the guilty activity of the accused, both mental and
physical, which justifies punishment. It is not the hypothetical activities
of the "reasonable person" which should be the criterion for fault.
Feminist theorists have taken exception to this structuring of fault in
sexual assault. 20 Placing the crucial factor for the determination of guilt
in the minds of accused (typically men) sacrifices women's interest in
the security of their bodies to the liberty interests of male accused. Many
feminists believe the appropriate balance here is to be reached through
the careful employment of the objective model of fault. 21 It is only
through the imposition of a legal duty to act reasonably that women can
be satisfactorily protected from sexual interference. This, however,
raises the liberal critique that individuals should not be punished as an

See T. Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating ;Wells Rea to the Crime" ( 1980),
30 U.T.L.J. 75; and T. Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on Pappajohn"
(1980), 30 U.T.L.J. 415.
21 lbtd.
20
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instrument of public policy. To do so denies the Kantian ethic that
individuals are never to be treated as the means to an end. 22
Thus we have a true dilemma: the premise of the liberal argument
for subjective fault denies the premise of the feminist argument for
objective fault. This amounts to an incommensurability between the two
doctrinal orthodoxies. This incommensurability rests on the liberal/
subjectivist's insistence that the individual must play an active part in
his mental guilt. Liberals have insisted that the required activity is only
found in the subjective awareness of a risk, or the deliberate suppression
thereof, and a decision to proceed despite that risk. There is, however, an
alternate form of cognitive activity which justifies the imposition of
punishment. This activity can be demonstrated via the conception of
willful blindness which is already being employed by Canadian courts,
such as in Sansregret.
This alternative analysis of willful blindness attempts to establish a
middle ground between the subjectivist's assertion that an honest
mistake as to consent is exculpatory and the objectivist's assertion that
only reasonable mistakes are exculpatory. The analysis employs an
intuitive approach to hypothetical examples, drawing explicit attention
to the manner in which beliefs are formed and held. The use of "active
suppression" of risk awareness may generate a new conception of
willful blindness, and it is hoped that the subjective activity of this new
conception will be sufficient to meet liberal concerns regarding the
justification of punishment while, at the same time, satisfying feminist
demands for greater protection of women from sexual assault.

PART

II

The basic aim of epistemology is to determine the conditions under
which an individual can be said to have knowledge in respect of some
fact. Traditionally, this has been determined using a tripartite analysis;
knowledge is obtained when one has a justified, true belief. Thus, one
has knowledge in respect of some fact if, and only if one believes the fact
to be true, one is justified in believing it to be true, and the fact is, indeed,
22
B. Rolfes, "The Golden Thread of the Criminal Law
Assault" (1998), 61 Sask. L. Rev. 87.

Moral Culpability and Sexual
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uue. 23 This analysis employs both objective and subjective elements.
The subjective element is the belief actually held by the individual. The
objective element is the truth of that which is believed. The subjective
fact of the belief is linked to the objective fact of truth via the hybrid
condition of justification. The justification condition is hybrid to the
extent that it must be actually held in the mind of the believer
(subjective) and it must also be objectively capable of supporting the
inference that the fact believed is probable. 24
This tripartite analysis of knowledge (justified true belief) is not
employed in the legal analysis of subjective guilt. This is likely due to
the fact that talk of "justification" sounds like a resort to the objective
model. When subjective knowledge of circumstance forms an element
of an offence, the law employs what might be called a bipartite analysis:
a purely objective inquiry (a determination as to the presence of the
actus reus) and a purely subjective inquiry (determination as to the
presence of mens rea). The trier of fact is to determine whether the
prescribed condition actually existed at the time of the alleged offence,
and whether the particular accused believed the condition to exist. On an
epistemological account this arrangement is too simplistic and is bound
to result in error.
For instance, consider the following hypothetical example.
Imagine that Mark lives next to a pawnshop. Mark believes the owner of
23

For instance, I know that the computer I am currently working on is a Macintosh if, and
only if; I believe it is a Mac, I am justified in holding this belief, and it is in fact true that the
computer is a Mac.
24
Thus, I know that the computer I am currently using is a Macintosh if, and only if: I
believe it is a Mac, it is in fact a Mac, and I believe in some condition which makes it
objectively probable that it is a Mac. For instance, this justification could follow from the fact
that I have observed a small apple-like logo on the computer's exterior. In this case the
justification would be founded on a perception combined with a belief that Macintosh
computers cany such a logo. Alternatively, my justification could reside in a belief that the
computer's owner is a die-hard Macintosh enthusiast who would not likely consider
purchasing anything but that particular brand of computer. In this case, my belief is justified
on the basis of other beliefs. In the first instance, where my belief is generated though
observation, an epistemologist would say that my belief is founded on perception. It is a
perceived condition of the computer that makes it likely to be a Mac. In the second instance, it
is not a condition about the computer itself that makes it likely to be a Mac, but rather a belief
about its owner, specifically that she bought it and that she would likely only buy a Mac. An
epistemologist would label this belief as justified by coherence with other beliefs. The only
infonnation I have about the computer is its owner, yet my beliefs about the owner can justify
beliefs about the computer itself.
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the pawnshop is a crook and that his entire inventory consists of stolen
goods. Mark therefore avoids dealings with the shop owner, despite the
availability of some good deals. One day Mark walks by the shop and
notices a saxophone for sale in the window. Mark has always wanted to
play the saxophone, but has never been able to afford one at retail prices.
Despite the fact that he believes the saxophone to be stolen, Mark
can not pass up the opportunity to realize his dream. He buys the
instrument, takes it home, and begins to learn how to play. After a while,
however, Mark becomes consumed by guilt over his actions and every
note reminds him of his misdeed. He decides to tum himself in to the
police and take responsibility.
The police are baffled by all of this as they know the pawnshop
owner and hold him in the highest regard. The owner routinely calls
police regarding suspicious goods and his reputation in the community
is beyond reproach. Despite this, the police check the serial number on
the sax and discover that it was in fact stolen in a break-and-enter some
years ago.
This raises the question of Mark's guilt or innocence. He believed
the saxophone to be stolen at the time he purchased it, and it was in fact
stolen. Thus, it seems that both the actus reus and mens rea of the
offence of possession of stolen goods are present and readily provable.
On the bipartite analysis this would indicate Mark's guilt. However, if
Mark's belief that the shop owner is a crook is not justified, then the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea is merely that, coincidence. In the
absence of any justification for believing the shop owner to be a crook,
Mark's belief is mere folly. It would be equally capricious for the
criminal justice system to compound the folly of Mark's belief by
attaching criminal liability to it. One might choose to exculpate Mark on
the basis that he did not know the sax was stolen; he merely believed it to
be stolen and his belief happened to be true. Mark made a mistake in
believing the sax to be stolen, not because it was untrue, but because he
had no justification for his belief.
Thus, the bipartite analysis of fault must be complimented by a
doctrine of mistake if it is to avoid, on principled grounds, the
imposition of punishment in absurd ways. This raises a question as to
the conditions under which mistaken belief should exculpate an
accused. Current doctrine places only one condition on mistaken belief:
honesty. Honesty, in this doctrinal account, is synonymous with
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"actually held". Thus, under the doctrine, a mistaken belief actually held
is exculpatory. However, this can also lead to absurdities. Consider the
following hypothetical examples of two individuals who come into
possession of cocaine.
Mr. Jones has a rather strange hobby: he collects small items he
finds on the streets of Halifax. He believes his collection will serve as a
valuable historic account of ordinary life in the late 20th century. One
day Jones is walking down the sidewalk when he sees a small glass vial,
apparently discarded, on the side of the street. He picks up the vial and
notices it has a label on which is written the word "cocaine". This alaims
Jones as he would really like to add the item to his collection, but he does
not wish to run afoul of the law. His anxiety is put to rest, however, when
he notices the vial contains a pure white powder. Believing that cocaine
is deep blue in colour, Jones reasons that even heavily diluted cocaine
could never be so white. Having settled his mind that the powder is not
cocaine (or any other narcotic) he places the vial in his pocket and
continues down the street.
Prof. Smith is a prominent biochemist and ecologist. He is
notorious for asserting a rather strange theory that cocaine does not
exist. Smith has written extensively on the non-existence of cocaine, his
theory being that the coca plant is long extinct and that drug dealers are
exploiting a psychosomatic effect by passing off benign white powder
as a drug. On this basis he has advocated that the narcotic control law be
amended, removing "cocaine" as a prohibited substance. Smith's theory
has met with much resistance in the scientific field. This has only
strengthened his resolve to prove his theory.
Smith decides to prove his theory by running an experiment. He
has found twenty graduate students in the biology department who have
agreed to volunteer as subjects, but they have not been told the exact
nature of the experiment which is to take place. Smith has purchased a
quantity of white powder from a local drug dealer. He has tested the
chemical composition of the powder and has found it to match the
composition of so-called "cocaine". He mixes the powder into ten
glasses of orange juice and pours another ten glasses of unadulterated
juice. The glasses of juice are then distributed to the volunteers and their
behaviour is observed and recorded.
Is either Jones or Smith guilty of any crime? One may intuit that
Mr. Jones is not guilty of possession of a narcotic and that Prof. Smith is
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guilty of both possession and trafficking. This intuition is difficult to
explain given conventional legal doctrine. It seems that both men were
under an honest mistaken belief that the powder in their possession was
not cocaine. Mr. Jones honestly believed that it was not cocaine because
it was not blue. Prof. Smith believed that the powder was not cocaine
because he believes that nothing is "cocaine". As well, each man's belief
in respect of the powder was unreasonable. Reasonable people know
that when they find a strange vial of white powder labeled "cocaine",
there is a very real risk that the contents are actually cocaine. Reasonable
people also know that when one approaches a drug dealer, asks for
cocaine, and is given a quantity of white powder, the powder is probably
cocaine. Furthermore, it seems that Jones (the innocent party) will have
a difficult time establishing the defence of mistake. His subjective belief
that cocaine is blue is so objectively unreasonable that it is unlikely that
any trier of fact would view it as credible. Smith, on the other hand, will
be able to advance a great deal of evidence tending to establish his
honest belief that the powder was not cocaine (i.e. his previous writings
describing his theory, conversations with colleagues, etc.).
If one is correct in the intuition that Jones has acted innocently and
that Smith has not, then the difference cannot be accounted for on any of
the following bases: honesty qfbe/if!/(each man, by hypothesis, actually
held a belief that the powder was not cocaine); reasonableness efbelt([/
(each belief was unreasonable); or evtdentiaryconstderations(the guilty
man will have no trouble forwarding credible evidence while the
innocent man will only have his word). This leaves one with the task of
explaining intuitions about the innocence of Mr. Jones and the guilt of
Prof. Smith on grounds not mentioned above. 25
The difference might be explained by considering three separate
factors. First, Smith's belief about the non-existence of cocaine is what
epistemologists would call recalcitrant. This means that the structure of
his belief system is unresponsive to change, due to a high degree of
internal coherence. Smith's beliefs about cocaine have formed an
interconnected web such that perceptual indications inconsistent with
the cohered system are discarded as unworthy of consideration or belief.

25 Perhaps the best explanation is that my intuitions are simply incorrect. I think they are
con-ect, but there is room for reasonable disagreement on the matter.
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There is an active suppression of true belief inherent in the way Smith
interacts with his environment. 26
Compare this to Jones. The belief that led him aw1y was not
recalcitrant; it was an isolated mistake regarding a feature indicative of
cocaine, namely its colour. This single belief does not cohere into a
system. Jones continued to inspect objects in his possession and
attempted to determine the presence of cocaine. To this extent he is still
responsive to his environment. He failed in his attempt to determine
whether the powder was cocaine, but only because of a simple mistake.
Moreover, Smith's recalcitrant web of belief regarding the nonexistence of cocaine is inconsistent with the criminal law. The law
asserts, as one of its premises, that cocaine exists. Smith's belief
structure denies this assumption. In respect of cocaine, Smith's belief
structure has become a law unto itself. Jones' beliefs, on the other hand,
do not deny any fundamental assumptions of the criminal law. His
mistake is consistent with the law, but has led him astray in his attempt
to obey it.
The last salient feature of the difference between the two men is
that Smith's beliefs cause him to act in a way that puts others at a risk of
hann. Smith does not realize this, but it is true nonetheless. Jones'
beliefs, and the actions motivated by them, do not place others at a direct
risk of harm.
Smith might, therefore, be justifiably punished on the grounds that
he unreasonably believed what might be called a "myth" about cocaine.
He believed in this myth so strongly that it led him to reject any
perceptions inconsistent with it. The myth, in a sense, distorted his
perception of reality and actively suppressed the fonnation of true
belief. While the reasonable person's beliefs reflect reality, Smith's
reality became a reflection of his beliefs. What's more, the myth itself is
both inconsistent with the law and likely to subject people to the type of
harm contemplated by the law.
Given this, a case can be made that Smith's beliefs about cocaine
come extremely close to the current legal doctrine of willful blindness.
While there is no deliberate suppression of knowledge, there is an active
26
This is comparable to a situation where someone believes so strongly that a computer is
a Macintosh (because of the fidelity of its Mac-loyal owner) that he begins to reject
observations to the contrary (the IBM logo was painted on as a joke, the IBM warranty card
attached to the back belongs to another computer, etc.).
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suppression of knowledge by the workings of the mind. Furthermore,
the current insistence on deliberate suppression is problematic in two
ways. First, in so far as the process of suppression is supposed to be
deliberate, it is indistinguishable from recklessness. One would only be
motivated to act deliberately if one were aware of the potential presence
of risk. Once the mind has averted to a risk, recklessness attaches to any
actions until concerns about the risk have passed. This can only happen
by giving the risk further consideration and not by deliberately ignoring
it. Second, the process of belief formation is automatic and not subject to
influences of the will. Individuals acquire beliefs regarding risks as soon
as they evaluate some justification for believing risk is present. Once
this happens, the belief in the risk remains until such time as it ceases to
be justified. For instance, one might notice that one is showing the
symptoms of a disease. As soon as this happens, one will automatically
form a belief regarding the risk of actually having the disease. As long as
the symptoms remain and are not explained as being caused by some
other factor, belief in the risk will remain. The belief in the risk will not
always be at the fore of the mind and the individual may even attempt to
ignore it by thinking about other things, but the belief in the risk will
continue so long as its justification continues.
Given these two considerations, it seems that a doctrine of willful
blindness which focuses on an active suppression of true belief is a
better epistemological model than one based on deliberate suppression
of true belief. A new concept of willful blindness based on active
suppression seems to capture the intent of the old doctrine while
avoiding two of its problematic features. An "active suppression" model
of willful blindness is distinct from recklessness and not founded on
shaky epistemological grounds.

PART

ill

In order to examine how a new conception of willful blindness may
relate to sexual assault offences, it is necessary to begin by looking at the
structure of the offence and examining the elements the Crown is
required to prove. Section 265 of the Criminal Code defines sexual
assault:
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265. (1) Assault-A person commits an "assault" when
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force
intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly. 27

The recent case of .R. v. Ewanchuli2 8 provides a comprehensive
judicial interpretation of sexual assault. In Ewanchukthe Supreme Comi
held that the actus reus of "without consent" is determined through a
subjective inquiry into the attitude of the complainant. To establish the
actus reus, the Crown must prove that the complainant did not want to
engage in the sexual activity. The mens rea of this element is established
upon proof that the accused had subjective knowledge that the
complainant did not communicate consent. If the defence can raise a
reasonable doubt as to either of these issues, an acquittal should follow.
However, if the prosecution has a strong case with respect to these
issues, a tactical shift occurs. In this event, the defence will likely want
to raise a reasonable doubt as to the fact that the accused believed
consent was communicated. If the trier of fact is satisfied, on the
criminal standard, that consent was not communicated, then defence
arguments about the accused's subjective belief that consent was
communicated will amount to the defence of honest mistaken belief in
consent. This "failure of proof' defence is the topic with which the rest
of the paper will be concerned.
The first feature to note is the explicit holding in Ewanchukthat the
defence of mistaken belief in consent relates only to the accused's
beliefs regarding communication of consent. A mistake to the effect that
the accused believed the complainant desired the sexual activity is
irrelevant. The desires of the complainant are only relevant to the
establishment of the actus rezts. The defence of mistake pertains only to
the mens rea element, and the only material issue here is the accused's
beliefs regarding any communication which occurred prior to the sexual
touching.
This legal distinction between actus reus "consent" (the subjective
attitude of the complainant) and mens rea "consent" (the beliefs of the
accused regarding communication of permission to touch) is

27

28

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
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problematic both conceptually and pragmatically. 29 The first problem is
that the trier of fact may confuse the two types of "consent". This has
been ameliorated to a large extent by the explicit instructions in
Ewanchulc. The second problem is not quite so easily dealt with. It
involves the way in which an accused's beliefs about the desires
(attitude) of the complainant are likely to influence his interpretation of
any communication arising between himself and the complainant.
A belief on the part of an accused that the complainant wanted to
engage in sexual touching is not relevant to any formal element of the
offense of sexual assault. However, this belief will likely have a great
influence on the accused's interpretation of communication, which is a
material element. If an accused's belief that the complainant desired the
sexual touching causes him to interpret communication in such a way
that he believed consent was granted, then an irrelevant belief forms the
basis for his holding a relevant belief (i.e. a belief which establishes the
defence of mistake of fact). This, in effect, would allow an accused to
take indirect advantage of a belief which is not directly relevant.
For this reason, it is submitted that a novel doctrine of willful
blindness is necessary in order to determine guilt in sexual assault cases
where mistaken belief in consent is raised. The doctrine will closely
resemble that described in Pati II of this paper. If the accused's beliefs
about the attitude of the complainant actively suppressed a correct
interpretation of her communications, then the accused should be barred
from asserting his mistaken belief that consent was communicated. The
justification for this is supplied by the same intuitions that justified
finding Prof. Smith guilty. First, a mistaken belief that a complainant
wanted to engage in sexual activity is likely to be recalcitrant to the
extent that it will colour the accused's interpretation of communication.
If an accused honestly believed that a complainant wanted to engage in
sexual activity, then he is likely to have interpreted indications of "no"
as indications of "yes". His beliefs are likely to cohere into a myth about
the meaning of the particular communication that took place. A belief in
a myth that actively suppresses the correct interpretation of
communication must not form the basis for exculpating an accused. To
29
An excellent discussion of the problems here is found in N. Brett, "Sexual Offenses and
Consent" (1998), 11 Can. J.L. & Juris. 69. I would also like to thank Prof. Brett for his
commentary on the ideas in this paper.

R. V.SANSREGRET ... 341

do so would simply foster the holding of myths about women and when
they consent to sex. Second, a mistaken belief that a complainant wanted
to engage in sexual activity denies a premise of the criminal law: it is the
complainant's attitude which is determinative of her desires, including
the desire not to be interfered with. This is a basic tenet of autonomy,
and autonomy must be a central concern of sexual assault law if
women's interests are to be adequately protected. Allowing an
accused's belief about the complainant's desires to determine (even if
only indirectly) whether he has broken the law would distort the
autonomy interests involved. Third, an accused's incorrect belief that a
complainant desired sexual activity is likely to place women directly at
risk of the very harm contemplated by sexual assault law. To allow these
types of mistaken beliefs to fonn paii of an exculpatory mechanism
would significantly erode the protection the law is supposed to provide.
A new doctrine of willful blindness based on a model of active
suppression would affect a true separation of the two types of consent
contemplated in the Ewanchuk decision. Given that this separation
played a significant role in the decision, adoption of the new model
seems justified.

PARTIV
The employment of this novel doctrine of willful blindness, based on
active suppression, would result in a number of procedural changes in
the way sexual assaults are tried. In order to establish this type of willful
blindness, the Crown would have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the accused intentionally touched the complainant in a sexual
manner, the complainant did not want the touching to occur, and the
complainant did not communicate permission to be touched. Proof of
these elements could result in a finding of willful blindness if the trier of
fact is satisfied that the accused's mistaken belief in consent was both
unreasonable and caused by an active suppression of a correct
interpretation of the complainant's non-communication of consent.
An accused could defend against a finding of willful blindness by
establishing evidence tending to show that his unreasonable belief in
communication of consent was not due to active suppression of the
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correct interpretation. He could do this by showing that his mistaken
belief was based on something other than his belief about the
complainant's desires (or the desires of women in general). His
mistaken belief would not have to be reasonable, just founded on
something other than myth. Consider the following example.
Imagine that Adam and Beth are intimate sexual partners. They
have been seeing each other for a while and are looking to "spice up"
their sexual relationship. Each is interested in acting out a particular
sexual fantasy. They agree that Adam will come to Beth's apartment on
a given night at precisely 9:00 p.m. He will pretend to break into the
apartment and force himself on Beth, who will pretend to resist his
advances. Beth gives Adam the key to her apartment for this purpose.
Imagine that two separate incidents occur, causing these plans to go
horribly awry. First, on the night in question Beth is held up by an
emergency at work and is unable to return to her apartment by 9:00 p.m.
or to inform Adam of this fact. Second, Beth's identical twin sister,
Carla, has arrived in town for a surprise visit with Beth. Carla has let
herself into Beth's apartment with a spare key. She waits there in
anticipation of Beth's return from work. Adam has never met Carla and
does not even know that Beth has a sister. At 9:00 p.m., Adam arrives at
Beth's apartment and the inevitable ensues.
If Adam is charged with sexually assaulting Carla, the Crown will
likely be able to prove that intentional sexual activity took place, that
Carla did not desire the touching, and that her protests communicated
her non-consent. If we assume that Adam's actions were unreasonable
(a reasonable person would not have accepted the risk inherent in this
sort of plan or, alternatively, would have asked for further explicit
agreement just prior to the activity), then Adam's mistaken belief in
communication of consent is either a result of willful blindness or
exculpatory as negating mens rea.
In this situation, it appears that Adam's mistake was an isolated
mistake about the identity of the woman in Beth's apartment. His
mistaken belief was not of such a nature that it suppressed true
knowledge; had Adam realized, through perception, that it was not Beth
in the apartment, he would not have proceeded with his actions. Adam
proceeded in ignorance of Carla's identity, but not through an active
suppression of the truth.
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Contrast the above hypothetical situation with the actual incident
involving Sansregret described at the beginning of this paper. Sansregret
intentionally caused the fear that induced his former girlfriend's
pretence of consent. Therefore, he must have been aware of her fear. For
Sansregret to be ignorant of this fact, he must have been relying on a
belief that his ex-girlfriend actually desired the sexual interaction. When
it was found, as a matter of fact, that she did not desire the activity, there
was no basis for thinking that Sansregret's mistake had been based on
anything except an active suppression of the truth. Having no foundation
for his unreasonable belief in genuine consent, Sanregret's conviction
on the basis of willful blindness seems appropriate.

CONCLUSION

It bears pointing out that a new conception of willful blindness

based on active suppression of truth helps to rectify the standoff between
feminists and liberals. A new notion of willful blindness accomplishes
two objectives which con-espond with feminist ideals. First, it may help
to convict men who subject women to violence. Second, it takes the
crime of rape out of the minds of men (subjective mistaken belief in
consent) and places an appropriate focus on actual female
communications and the meaning of consent. In effect, this would deny
accused men the ability to rely on recalcitrant myths about women,
female consent, and sexual assault. This legal denial may eventually
erode such myths in society and actually make women more safe and
secure in their bodies.
Furthermore, the inclusion of female interests would not come at
the expense of imprisoning men solely as an implementation of public
policy. Men convicted under an active suppression model of willful
blindness would be the agents of their own punishment. This is due to
the level of activity involved in the way they disregard communications
of non-consent. A man who receives an indication that a woman does
not give permission to be touched sexually, disregards the
communication on the basis that it is inconsistent with his interpretation
of the situation, and then proceeds with sexual activity, cannot claim
innocence. He has acted, both mentally and physically, and he has acted
culpably in each sense. Guilt attaches to both his act and his mind, each
of which conspired to cause harm.

